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Abstract 
 
This study explores whether the relation between internal audit quality and firm performance is 
associated with firm characteristics of information asymmetry and uncertainty (growth 
opportunities) and certain governance controls (audit committee effectiveness). The results from 
this preliminary study of 60 Malaysian companies show that the association between internal 
audit quality and firm performance is stronger for firms with high growth opportunities and that 
this positive association is weakened by increasing audit committee independence.  These 
findings demonstrate the internal auditors conflicting roles and question the governance 
recommendations that require all members of the audit committee to be non-executive directors. 
 
 
 
Key words: Growth opportunities, internal audits, audit committee, agency costs, firm 
performance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the role of internal audit quality on firm performance in a sample of 
Malaysian firms. It extends prior research on the role of internal audits (e.g., Carcello, Hermanson, 
and Raghunandan, 2005; Jensen and Payne, 2003; Nagy and Cenker, 2002), including whether the 
role should be outsourced (e.g. Caplan and Kirschenheiter, 2000).  The study is motivated by three 
factors. First, prior research suggests that internal audits can have a positive influence on 
corporate governance, including reporting quality and firm performance (e.g. Gramling, Maletta, 
Schneider and Church, 2004).  Despite widespread acceptance of the benefits of internal auditing, 
there is relatively little documented empirical research on the role of internal auditing on firm 
performance.  Further, it appears that the quality of the internal audit department is more 
important than the existence of an internal audit department. For example, Davidson, 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) find no significant association between voluntary establishing 
an internal audit function and a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals.  This finding 
suggests that merely establishing an internal audit does not control managers‟ incentives to 
manage earnings. Second, organizational theory and contracting theory suggests that only certain 
types of organizations with particular firm characteristics could benefit from internal audit quality 
 4 
(IAQ).
1
 According to organizational contingency theory, linkages between specific management 
control systems and firm performance are likely to depend on contextual and environmental 
factors (Chenhall, 2003). Similarly, according to contracting theory the relationship between 
management control systems and firm performance depends on the costs of writing and enforcing 
contracts which may vary depending on firm characteristics (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  In 
this study we draw on contracting theory to investigate whether growth opportunities and audit 
committee independence affect the relationship between IAQ and firm performance. Third, while 
several studies have focused on internal auditing issues in developed countries, such as the USA 
and UK, there is little evidence from emerging markets such as Malaysia.  Malaysian firms are of 
interest to this area of research because during this period it was mandatory for listed Malaysian 
companies to have an audit committee
2
 while forming an internal audit function was voluntary.
3
  
Therefore, establishing an internal audit department is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
                                                 
1
 SAS 65 (AICPA 1991) describes internal audit quality characteristics as comprising of competence (i.e. educational 
level, certification and prior experience), objectivity (e.g., reporting relationship, party responsible for appointment 
and termination of internal auditors), and quality of work performance (e.g., adequacy of audit programs). Likewise, 
the IIA standard 1210 on internal auditor‟s proficiency specifies that the internal auditors should possess the 
knowledge, skills and other competencies needed to perform in order to ensure audit effectiveness. In our study, we 
focus on   internal auditors‟ competence, proxied by auditing experience and certification of the internal audit staff. 
2
 In August 1994 the Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMB) Listing Requirements made it mandatory for all public listed 
companies to have an audit committee.  Further, to enhance the effectiveness of the audit committee, the BMB Listing 
Requirements amended its listing rules in 2001 requiring public listed companies to include the Audit Committee 
Report in their Annual Reports.  The ten mandatory requirements for the Audit Committee Report are: (1) the audit 
committee should comprise of at least three members, (2) the majority of the audit committee should be composed of 
independent directors, (3) at least one of the audit committee members is financially literate, (4) the chairman of the 
audit committee must be an independent director, (5) no alternate director of the audit committee is appointed as a 
member, (6) there are written terms of reference, (7) the number of meetings should be noted, (8) the majority 
attending the meeting should be independent directors, (9) there should be a summary of audit committee activities 
and (10) a summary of internal audit activities should also be produced. 
3
 Although it is not mandatory to establish an internal audit function, an interesting issue is the revamped Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad Listing Requirements (Previously know as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) in particular Para 
15.27 (b) states that a listed issuer must ensure that its board of directors includes in its annual report as a “statement 
about the state of internal control of the listed issuer as a group”. 
 5 
Malaysian companies.
4
  In addition, the necessity for stringent corporate governance in Malaysia 
is demonstrated by the alleged accounting fraud at Technology Resources Industries Berhad (see 
Fadzil, Haron and Jantan, 2005).  In this paper we provide some insights on whether internal 
auditing as a monitoring/control mechanism is linked to firm performance in Malaysian firms.    
The first objective of this paper is to determine if there is an association between internal 
audit quality and firm performance.  The professional literature identifies both accounting 
qualifications and prior auditing experience of the internal audit staff as important ingredients for 
an effective internal audit function (e.g. the Research Committee of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland in McInnes, 1993).  However, the relation between IAQ and firm 
performance is unlikely to be straightforward since both organizational theory and contracting 
theory suggests that only certain types of organizations with particular firm characteristics could 
benefit from IAQ. Since, prior evidence drawn from contracting theory suggests that growth (or 
investment) opportunities is likely to affect firm performance (see Smith and Watts, 1993; Baber 
et al. 1996) we us also examine if growth opportunities affects the linkage between IAQ and firm 
performance. Contracting theory suggests that firms with high growth opportunities are 
associated with high information asymmetry and managers of these high growth firms are more 
difficult to monitor (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Baber et al. 1996).  Therefore, 
the role of IAQ is expected to be more beneficial for such firms.  This study seeks to determine 
                                                 
4
 During the year 2000, the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in Malaysia approved the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance (MCCG).  In contrast with the BMB Listing Requirements, the MCCG  BB VII in Part 2 
Best Practice Provision specifically recommends the board establish an internal audit function and maintain a sound 
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whether the link between IAQ and firm performance is dependent on the level of growth 
opportunities of the firm.   
As audit committees are also part of the internal control system of a firm, the second 
objective of this paper is to determine whether audit committee independence has an impact on 
the association between IAQ and the performance of growth firms. Hermanson and Rittenberg 
(2003) suggest that the role of the auditor is one of preeminent monitoring and reporting to the 
board on the effectiveness of corporate governance.  They foresee a possible conflict between the 
role of the internal audit function and the role of the audit committee and these tensions could 
affect organizational outcomes
5
. Together with Gramling et al (2004), they suggest that we need 
to understand how the internal audit function interacts with the audit committee, management, 
and the external auditors to achieve quality corporate governance.  By examining the interaction 
between IAQ and audit committee independence on the performance of growth firms we shed 
some light on this question.   
The data for this study of Malaysian firms is obtained from two sources. The first source is a 
survey of Malaysian firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia Berhad
6
 to obtain data on internal auditing. 
The second source is the annual reports of the firms responding to the survey.  The data on firms‟ 
growth opportunities, audit committee and profitability is collected from the 2003 financial 
                                                                                                                                                            
system of internal control to safeguard shareholders‟ investments and the company‟s assets. 
5
 The issue of the potential for tension between the internal audit department and audit committees is also raised by 
the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation (2005).  
6
 The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) changed its name to the Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMB) on April 20, 
2004. 
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reports.  Prior studies of Malaysian firms have examined the internal control practices of the 
internal audit function but not the implications on firm performance. Research of Malaysian firms 
demonstrate the importance of the internal audit by showing that management relies on internal 
audits to provide assurance on matters relating to internal control such as the provision of an 
independent review of efficient operations (Ernst and Young, 2005; Fadzil et al., 2005).   Recent 
research by Mak and Kusnadi (2005) examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on the value of Singapore and Malaysia firms (as measured by Tobin's Q).  The only significant 
association they find is a negative relationship between board size and firm value.  They fail to 
find any significant association between either audit committee size or the proportion of 
independent directors on the audit committee and firm value.   
The evidence provided in this study suggests links between the performance of firms 
adopting a growth strategy and the quality of the internal audit function.  Further, this study 
demonstrates that these associations are moderated by audit committee independence.  Using 
observations from 60 Malaysian firms, this paper provides preliminary evidence that there is a 
positive association between IAQ and firm performance for firms with high growth opportunities, 
but not for firms with low growth opportunities. Further, we also show that, in the presence of an 
independent audit committee, the positive association between IAQ and performance for high 
growth firms disappears, suggesting a conflict effect between IAQ and audit committee.  These 
preliminary findings suggest that focusing attention on the composition of the audit committee 
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ignores the essential skills required for an effective AC.  “Overemphasis on monitoring and 
control risks non-executive directors seeing themselves, and being seen, as an alien policing 
influence…..  An overemphasis on strategy risks non-executive directors becoming too close to 
management… (Higgs Report 2003:27).  An effective AC attains the appropriate balance between 
internal and independent directors; a great proportion of either can swing the balance in the wrong 
direction and cause conflict with the role of the IA. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, this study provides evidence 
from an emerging economy, Malaysia.  Given the globalization of business, there is increasing 
interest in accounting and control issues in these countries.  Second, this study demonstrates that 
research can successfully utilize both survey methodology and accounting data to study 
management control issues.  Third, the results of this study are consistent with the notion that 
internal audits provide higher levels of control and monitoring that are associated with 
performance.  However, this association is dependent on the firm‟s growth opportunities.  Our 
results imply that it may not be economically efficient to establish an internal audit function in the 
absence of growth opportunities.  Fourth, this study demonstrates the contingent nature of IAQ 
and how IAQ is related to other corporate governance controls, such as audit committee.  The 
results of this study question whether firm performance is enhanced when internal audits are 
expected to serve as a resource to the audit committee and management, placing the internal 
auditor in a situation of possible conflict.  Finally, this paper contributes to the literature by 
 9 
integrating management control and corporate governance theory in terms of the role of IAQ and 
audit committees and shows that such integration provides a deeper understanding of how and 
why these variables interact to affect firm performance.  This evidence is not available in the 
extant literature. 
 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
An increasing number of earnings restatements along with allegations of financial statement 
fraud committed by high profile companies have eroded public confidence in corporate 
governance, the financial reporting process, and audit functions (Rezaee, et al., 2003).  
Subsequently, the firm‟s internal control environment is under scrutiny.  As part of the overall 
internal control environment, the internal auditor and the audit committee have a responsibility to 
provide oversight on the reliability of financial reporting.  The Institute of Internal Auditors (2000) 
suggests that the internal audit function should bring a systematic approach to evaluating and 
improving the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes.  This is likely 
to lead to increased responsibilities placed on the internal audit function and audit committee of 
companies that previously did not have or outsourced the internal audit function.  Consequently, 
the internal audit function has greater responsibilities for supporting management and the audit 
committee.   
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2.1 Internal auditing and firm performance  
One of the roles of the internal auditor is to provide management with an independent and 
objective assurance that the organizations internal control system is effective, adequate and 
reliable (IIA, 2000).  In addition, the IA provides consulting on operational skills that focus on 
risks, evaluate the efficiency of operations and stimulate organizational actions (Hermanson and 
Rittenberg 2003).   In response to regulatory, environmental and technological change, IA is 
required to do much more than compliance work.  The IA must have a thorough knowledge of 
how their work contributes value and links to organizational strategies and achievement (Hass, 
Abdolmohammadi, and Burnaby, 2006).    Therefore, internal auditing is designed to add value 
and improve the organizations operations (Carcello et al., 2005).  Research on auditors‟ 
assessment of the criteria of IA competence includes IA training programs, with an emphasis on 
professional certifications (Brown, 1983), and IA experience (Messier and Schneider, 1988).   
Prior studies also suggest that the auditor should have professional qualification and prior 
experience if they are to lead a good quality audit (e.g. Brody et al., 1998). Boo and Koh‟s (2004) 
study indicates that audit team quality and attributes relate to their ability to suggest improvement 
to internal control systems; operational efficiency; risk management; and financial matters. Prior 
experience is important for internal auditors as many oversight judgments are subjective and 
managerial action may have pervading effects.  Therefore, in the absence of objective criteria, 
internal audit staff  not possessing prior experience in auditing (or less experience), may not 
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understand the wide range of existing and potential problems nor possess problem-solving skills 
(DeZoort, 1998). Consequently, an IA with greater training and experience is more able to provide 
assurance of the effectiveness and efficiency of oganisational controls in aligning with 
organizational strategies. Research by Fadzil et al (2005) supports this notion by finding that IAQ
7
 
significantly influences the quality of monitoring the internal control system. Mat Zain et al (2006) 
find that internal auditors contribute more to financial statement audits when they have a greater 
proportion of IA staff with prior experience in accounting and auditing. Research also finds that 
effective internal audits are more likely to detect and prevent fraud (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, 
and Lapides, 2000; KPMG Peat Marwick, 1999).   
The redefinition of internal control as risk management emphasizes the links to strategy 
formulation which is supported by the internal controls of the organization. All risks experienced 
by organizations have potential financial implications and so too does the risk management 
responsibility of the IA.  Further, the internal audit helps to maintain cost-efficient contracting 
between owners and managers.  Thus, the internal audit has the potential to augment the external 
audit function and reduce the overall monitoring costs.  For instance, research by Felix et al (2001) 
find that the contribution of IA to financial statement results in cost saving related to audit fees 
paid by the firm to their external auditors. Taken together, these preceding factors suggest that 
greater IAQ is associated with greater firm performance. 
                                                 
7
 IAQ also refers to the management of the internal audit department, professional proficiency, objectivity and 
review. 
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However, it is likely that the relation between IAQ and firm performance varies with 
organizational characteristics.  Despite increasing attention on IAQ, little is known about factors 
that influence the association between IAQ and firm performance. Why would higher IAQ be 
associated with better firm performance for some firms and not for others?  There are a myriad of 
factors that could influence the association between IAQ and firm performance.  Given the role of 
the IA as monitoring and managing risk, we examine whether the association between IAQ and 
firm performance is dependent on uncertain investment opportunities and the independence of the 
audit committee. 
2.2 Growth opportunities.   
Firms need to establish internal controls that manage risk effectively.  Risk has been defined 
as the possibility of loss as a result of a combination of uncertainty and exposure flowing from an 
investment decision or a commitment (Boritz, 1990).  The agency costs associated with high 
growth opportunities means that high growth firms have high levels of inherent risk
8
.  
Subsequently, high growth firms are more likely to benefit from higher IAQ, which means better 
financial performance.  The reasons for this proposition follow the research by Gaver and Gaver 
(1993) and Smith and Watts, (1992).  Low growth firms are valued independently of the firm‟s 
future investment opportunities while high growth firms are valued based on the firm‟s future 
discretionary investment decisions.  As low growth firms are pre-committed to a certain course of 
                                                 
8
 Inherent risk relates to the type of business and environment in which the firm operates. 
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activity, shareholder/manager conflict is low which minimizes agency costs.  In contrast, high 
growth firms incur greater agency costs because managers‟ actions are less discernible as the 
value of growth opportunities depends on further discretionary expenditures by managers
9
. The 
subsequent information asymmetry means that growth firms adopt particular strategies to monitor 
managers, including creating internal audit departments.  Carcello et al. (2005) suggest that 
greater information asymmetry increases the need for greater investment in IA to bond or 
monitor
10
 agents.   Further, high growth firms are more likely to encounter problems with internal 
control requiring greater monitoring and assistance from internal auditors (Carcello et al., 2005; 
Maletta and Kida, 1993).  However, it is not simply the existence of IA that is important, as 
demonstrated by Davidson et al. (2005), but the quality and effectiveness of the internal audit 
department that is important for firms with uncertain investment opportunities.  The IA must have 
the training and experience that links the evaluation of the risks associated with uncertain growth 
opportunities to the firm‟s strategies that achieve positive outcomes.  In the high-risk conditions of 
high growth opportunities, internal audit quality is a primary factor that influences internal audit 
contribution to firm performance.  Consequently, we expect a positive association between IAQ 
and firm performance for high growth firms.  The preceding discussion leads to the first 
hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
9
 Discretionary expenditures include capacity expansion projects, new product lines, maintenance and replacement of 
existing assets. 
10
 Internal auditing is a bonding cost incurred by agents to signal to the principal they are acting responsibly, while 
monitoring costs are incurred by the principal to protect their economic interest (Adams, 1994) 
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H1:   A combination of high quality internal audit (X1) and high levels of growth (X2) 
will have a positive impact on firm performance (Y).  
 
2.3 Audit committee.   
Audit committee oversight includes financial reporting, internal controls to assess risk and 
auditor activity (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed, 2002).
11
  The audit committee, as 
a governance mechanism, reduces information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers 
and therefore mitigates agency problems.  Research finds that firms without audit committees are 
more likely to have fraudulent financial reporting (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny, 1996) and 
earnings overstatement (DeFond and Jiamnalvo 1991).  To fulfill the oversight role, the audit 
committee must be independent from management, thus giving rise to the recent governance 
recommendations and regulations demanding an independent audit committee.    
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) mandates that the audit committees of listed companies 
consist entirely of independent directors and the recent amendments to the Bursa Malaysia 
corporate governance framework, which was introduced in 2008, requires all members of the 
audit committee to be non-executive directors.   
Research also provides evidence of the importance of audit committee independence (ACI). 
Krishnan (2005) find that independent audit committees and audit committees with financial 
                                                 
11
 In Malaysia the audit committee is required to prepare a summary of the principal internal audit activities and 
functions. These activities include audit of financial management and human resource operations and security 
controls. The reports should also mention that the audit committee has approved the internal audit program at the 
beginning of the year and the chief internal auditor has submitted regular reports on audit work and activities prior to 
the committee meeting.  In addition, the audit committee must be satisfied that the internal auditors have worked 
closely with external auditors to resolve issues raised by the external auditors in relation to the control issues in the 
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expertise are significantly less likely to be associated with the incidence of internal control 
problems
12
.  Likewise, Abbott et al. (2004) find that audit committees consisting of all 
independent members and with at least one member with accounting or related expertise are 
negatively associated with financial restatements. Beasley et al. (2000) find firms that commit 
fraud are likely to have less independent audit committees.
13
 
One of the main objectives of establishing an audit committee is to strengthen the board‟s 
ability to monitor the performance of managers. However, studies testing the association between 
ACI and firm performance are inconclusive.  Erickson et al. (2005) find a positive relationship 
between ACI and firm performance while Klein (1998) and Hsu (2008) find no significant 
association. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) fail to find any significant relationship between either audit 
committee size or the proportion of independent directors on the AC and firm value.  Failing to 
account for environmental uncertainty faced by the firms, such as uncertain investment 
opportunities, and interrelations between governance controls such as IAQ and ACI may have led 
to the conflicting results. 
An optimal internal control system is associated with the environment and the context in 
                                                                                                                                                            
organization (Haron, Jantan and Pheng, 2005, p. 193). 
12
 They investigated two levels of seriousness in internal control problems: reportable conditions and material 
weaknesses. The data on internal controls is acquired from the reports from companies changing auditors.  These 
companies are required to disclose any internal control problems that are pointed out by the predecessor auditors 
13
 Based on reputational capital enhancement theory, past studies argue that independent audit committees are more 
likely to demand a higher quality audit in order to protect their reputation as experts in decision making (Abbott & 
Parker 2000; Carcello & Neal, 2000).  Further Abbott & Parker (2000, p.56) argue that while an “audit committee 
service may increase directors‟ reputation as a monitor, it also exacerbates the potential reputational damage should 
the misstatement occur while the director serves on the audit committee”.  In addition, Baysinger and Butler (1985) 
find that independent audit committees are more willing to disagree with management and are more likely to insist on 
high quality audit. 
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which the system operates.  It is posited in this paper that a positive association between IAQ and 
firm performance is contingent on the level of risk faced by the firm, that is, high, but uncertain, 
growth opportunities
14
.  Further, Klein (2002) finds that audit committee independence declines 
as growth opportunities increase. This result is consistent with her expectation that managers 
demand for internal directors with expertise increases with the complexities and uncertainties of 
growth opportunities.  Klein (2002, p.436) also suggests that firms tailor audit committee 
composition to suit their economic environment.  Subsequently, the level of growth opportunities 
of the firm has the potential to influence the association between the IA and AC and subsequently, 
firm performance.  Previous research has found that high growth firms prefer an insider 
dominated board to integrate the practical activities of the firm around its strategies (Bathala and 
Rao, 1995; Hutchinson, 2001).  As growth opportunities are firm specific, subject to managerial 
decisions, inside directors have an essential role to play in providing valuable information to the 
AC about the firm‟s activities.  Donaldson and Davis (1994) suggest that inside directors make 
superior decisions, having access to corporate information and the ability to take a long-term 
view.   
Codes, regulations, and various best practice guides stress the importance of the internal 
audits‟ relation with other parties responsible for corporate governance.  However, research on the 
relations between internal audits and the audit committee is limited, focusing only on the 
                                                 
14
 Of course there are other risks that may be affect the association between IAQ and firm performance, such as audit 
risk, operating risk, financial risk, etc.    
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association between audit committee characteristics and the internal audit (e.g. DeZoort, 
Friedberg, and Reisch, 2000).  Internal audits have a dual role to play in the corporate governance 
of the organization, which places the internal auditor in a position of possible conflict. Hermanson 
and Rittenberg (2003, p. 34) suggest that there are  
“significant differences in functions and skill sets required when trying to serve audit 
committee needs, as opposed to meeting the needs of strategic and operational 
management. Management wants the internal auditor to provide both assurance and 
consulting based on broad operational skills that address risks, evaluate the efficiency 
of operations, and stimulate organizational action. On the other hand, the audit 
committee is more interested in assurance regarding controls.” 
Prior research demonstrates the complex and contingent nature of the association between 
internal audits and the audit committee.  The internal auditor in many firms reports directly to the 
CEO and the head of the audit committee rather than management because the audit committee‟s 
role is to monitor and report on the effectiveness of corporate governance (Krell, 2003).  However, 
Nagy and Cenker (2002), find, when interviewing internal audit directors, management primarily 
determines the role of the internal auditor, thus placing the IA in a position of potential conflict.  
Raghunandan, Read and Rama (2001) find that the audit committee independence
15
 and 
expertise
16
 is associated with their ability to influence internal auditors via access to the chief 
                                                 
15
 The proportion of independent directors on the audit committee. 
16
 The proportion of committee members with an accounting or finance background.  
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internal auditor and their ability to review internal audit activities.  Hence, an independent audit 
committee places greater demands on internal audits.  However, good corporate governance 
should be promoted without stifling entrepreneurial drive or impairing competitiveness. The 
business advisory group‟s to the original OECD principles states:  
“Entrepreneurs, investors and corporations need the flexibility to craft 
governance arrangements that are responsive to unique business 
contexts…..” (OECD, 1998, p.34).   
Subsequently, audit committee independence (ACI) may inhibit the performance of growth 
firms as the internal auditor focuses on the compliance requirements of the audit committee rather 
than assisting management with assessing the potentially profitable risks of uncertain investment 
opportunities.  Thus, ACI affects the strength of the relationship between IAQ and the performance 
of high growth firms.  No research is found that addresses these associations.  This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2:  A combination of both high quality internal audit (X1) and audit committee 
independence (X3) have a negative impact on firm performance (Y) for high 
growth firms (X2). 
 
 
3. Data  
Data on internal audit quality is collected though a mail questionnaire survey of public listed 
companies in Malaysia during 2003.  Five-hundred and four questionnaires were sent to the head 
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of the internal departments of public companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia Berhad.  A total of 
101 (20.03 percent) responses were received of which 60 (12 percent) were useable responses. Of 
the 41 non-useable responses, 30 were eliminated due to the companies having fully outsourced 
and co-sourced their internal audit functions, thus information relating to the quality of internal 
audits was unavailable. The remaining responses were excluded due to incomplete information. 
While the original questionnaire contained several questions, the two questions of interest in this 
paper deal with the auditing experience and accounting qualification of the internal audit staff. 
The relevant questions of the survey instrument on the internal audit function are reported in the 
appendix. Other information on firm performance, audit committees and growth opportunities is 
obtained from the annual reports of the respective firms (year-ending 2003) responding to the 
survey.  
3.1 Dependent variable 
The internal audit function includes risk management and better internal controls which 
should manifest in better firm performance. The dependant variable, firm performance is 
measured as the firm‟s return on assets (ROA).  We use this accounting based measure because 
internal audits and the audit committee are concerned with, among other things, providing 
assurance regarding the integrity of financial information, that is, that the firm‟s performance is 
accurately reported. Hence, we would expect to see a positive association between IAQ and firm 
performance.  
 20 
3.2 Independent variables 
The measure of internal audit quality is separated into two variables to capture the auditing 
experience (PSAPA) and accounting qualifications (PSAQ) of the internal audit staff.  PSAPA is 
the proportion of internal audit staff with prior work experience in auditing to the size of the 
internal audit function while PSAQ is the proportion of internal audit staff with an accounting 
qualification to the size of the internal audit function.  These measures also control for the size of 
the internal audit team since they are proportions of the total number of staff in the internal audit 
department.  Prior research and legislation suggests that audit committee effectiveness is 
dependent, in part, on the extent to which the committee is independent and suggest that the audit 
committee should consist of a majority of non-executive or independent directors (e.g. 
Raghunandan et al 2001)
17
.  Our measure of audit committee independence (ACI) is an indicator 
variable of audit committee effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total 
number of members in the audit committee).  The measure of growth adopted in this study, the 
market-to-book value of equity, is used extensively in prior research (e.g. Smith and Watts, 1992) 
and is obtained from the annual reports of the firms completing the usable responses to the 
questionnaire. 
 Following Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) and Gul and Chia (1994) we adopt the 
multiplicative model for testing our hypotheses. The model requires transformation of the 
                                                 
17
 Bursa Malaysia recently prohibited executive directors from being part of the audit committee. 
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independent variables into a point-scale for the analyses.  The three point-scales for PSAPA and 
PSAQ are determined following assessment of the distribution of the variables. Table 1 reports the 
distribution of the proportions for PSAPA and PSAQ.  The scores for each of the variables are 
converted to a three-point scale. PSAPA is a three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit 
staff with auditing experience: 1 if the proportion is <= 0.5; 2 if the proportion is > 0.5 and < 1; 
and, 3 if the proportion = 1.  PSAQ is a three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff 
with an accounting qualification: 1 if the proportion is <= 0.5; 2 if the proportion is > 0.5 and < 1; 
and, 3 if the proportion = 1.  The measure of audit committee independence (ACI), the proportion 
of independent members to the total number of members in the audit committee is: 0 if the 
proportion is < 0.7; 1 if the proportion is >= 0.7 and <= 1. The cut-off point is based on the 
distribution of the proportions. 
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Table 1  
Distribution of the variables 
  PSAPA PSAQ 
scale point   N N 
1 
proportion<=0.1 1 
19 
1 
17 
0.1<proportion<=0.2 2 1 
0.2<proportion<=0.3 2 0 
0.3<proportion<=0.4 2 5 
0.4<proportion<=0.5 12 10 
2 
0.5<proportion<=0.6 2 
10 
3 
11 
0.6<proportion<=0.7 4 3 
0.7<proportion<=0.8 3 3 
0.8<proportion<=0.9 1 2 
3 0.9<proportion<=1.0 31 31 32 32 
   60  60 
  
  ACI 
scale point   N 
0 
0.4<=proportion<0.5 1 
33 
0.5<=proportion<0.6 2 
0.6<=proportion<0.7 30 
1 
0.7<=proportion<0.8 18 
27 
0.8<=proportion<0.9 2 
0.9<=proportion<1.0 7 
   60 
   
3.3 Control variables   
Agency theory suggests that increased leverage controls agency costs by reducing the 
amount of cash available to managers for discretionary investments.   Hence, managers are 
constrained in making sub-optimal decisions from the debt-holders perspective.  Leverage and 
liquidity also impact on the firm‟s ability to generate profits. We use two measures of debt (total 
debt and long-term debt) which are included as control variables as they represents an external 
corporate governance control which is likely to impact on firm performance.  Leverage is 
measured as: Leverage = current and non-current borrowings divided by total equity.  This ratio 
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indicates how firms choose to finance operations.  The lower the ratio, the greater the protection 
for lenders, who rank before shareholders.  A measure of long term debt is included and is 
measured as NCL = net current liabilities divided by total assets.  The liquidity ratios, inventory 
ratio and accounts receivable ratio, are included in the model as these variables are likely to 
impact on firm risk. These variables are measured as: INV/TA – inventory divided by total assets; 
and, AR/TA – account receivable divided by total assets. 
 
4. Method 
 
4.1 Multiplicative model 
The multiplicative model (Althauser, 1971; Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990), used 
extensively in contingency-type research, is adopted for testing the interactive effects of internal 
auditor quality (IAQ), growth (market-to-book value of equity) and audit committee 
independence (ACI) on firm performance (ROA) in hypothesis one and hypothesis two. This 
involves using the following multiple regression equations: 
 
Y = a0 + a1 X1 + a2 X2 + a3 X1 X2 +                    (1) 
 
Y = b0 + b1 X1 + b2 X2 + b3 X3 + b4 X1 X2 + b5 X1 X3 + b6 X2 X3 + b7 X1 X2 X3 +   (2) 
 
Where Y = Firm performance (ROA); X1 = Internal auditor quality proxies using a three 
point scale for the proportion of internal audit staff with prior work experience in auditing to the 
size of the internal audit function (PSAPA) and proportion of internal audit staff with accounting 
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qualification to the size of the internal audit function (PSAQ); X2 = Growth is measured as the 
market-to-book value of equity; X3 = Audit committee independence using an indicator variable 
for the proportion of independent members to the size of the audit committee); X1 X2 , X1 X3 , X2 
X3 , X1 X2 X3 = Interaction of X1 , X2 and X3.  
The regression models test whether the interactive effects of the independent variables are 
important in explaining variations in firm performance. If a3 and b7 are significant, this is 
equivalent to saying that the corresponding incremental R
2
 is statistically significant at the same 
probability level (Southwood, 1978, p.1168; Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan., 1990, p.22; Cohen and 
Cohen, 1983; Hartmann and Moers, 1999). This means that the introduction of the term X1 X2 in 
equation (1) and X1 X2 X3 in equation (2) add significantly to the variance explained. However, 
this provides no information on whether the posited relationship is monotonic
18
. In order to test 
for a monotonic relationship, the partial derivatives from the above regression equations are 
examined (Southwood, 1978; Schoonhoven, 1981).  For example, in testing whether the 
relationship between IAQ and ROA depend on the level of a firm‟s growth opportunities (MBE) 
(hypothesis one), we take the partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to X1, as below: 
 
Y /  X1 = a1 + a3 X2            (3) 
 
The partial derivative of the impact of internal auditor quality (X1) on firm performance (Y) 
in equation (3) depends on the level of growth (X2). If the value of Y /  X1 in equation (3) is 
                                                 
18
 For a discussion on monotonic and non-monotonic effects, see Schoonhoven (1981). 
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always positive or always negative over the entire observable range of X2, the relationship 
between Y and X1 would be regarded as monotonic; otherwise, it would be regarded as 
non-monotonic. Similarly, the partial derivative of equation (2) with respect to X1 is examined, as 
below: 
 
Y /  X1 = b1 + b4 X2 + b5 X3 + b7 X2 X3        (4) 
 
Equation (4) illustrates that the relationship between Y and X1 depends on both the level of 
growth and audit committee independence.  If audit committee independence (X3) is a constant, 
equation (4) can be re-arranged as: 
 
Y /  X1 = (b1 + b5 X3) + (b4 + b7 X3) X2        (5) 
 
In this way, the effect of growth on the relationship between internal auditor quality and firm 
performance can be examined conditional on the independence of the audit committee. 
5. Results 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.  The average ROA is 4.7 percent while the 
average market-to-book ratio of equity (growth) is 1.51.  Leverage is 41 percent, the long term 
debt ratio is 14.5 percent and the liquidity ratios average between 13 and 14 percent. 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics (N = 60) 
     
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
     
     
ROA 0.047  0.057  0.253  -0.265  
PSAPA 2.200 3.000 3.000 1.000 
PSAQ 2.250 3.000 3.000 1.000 
ACE 0.450 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Growth  1.151 0.803 4.262 0.229 
Leverage 0.407 0.378 1.000 0.006 
INV/TA 0.133 0.069 0.990 0.000 
AR/TA 0.141 0.104 0.510 0.000 
NCL 0.145 0.075 0.790 0.000 
     
 
Notes: The variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the 
proportion of internal audit staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit 
function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the 
proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting qualification to the size of the internal audit function, 
1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; ACI – indicator variable of audit 
committee effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total number of members in the 
audit committee), 0 if proportion<0.7, 1 if 0.7<=proportion <=1; Growth - market-to-book value of 
equity; Leverage - current and non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA – inventory divided 
by total assets; AR/TA – account receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by 
total assets. 
 
The correlations between the dependent variable ROA and the independent variables are 
shown in Table 3.  The only variable that is positively and significantly correlated with ROA is the 
measure of growth opportunities.  The long-term debt ratio is negatively and significantly 
correlated with ROA. 
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Table 3  
Spearman Correlation Matrix 
          
Variable ROA PSAPA PSAQ ACI Growth  Leverage INV/TA AR/TA NCL 
          
          
ROA 1  0.064  0.083  0.003  0.569*** -0.280** -0.020 0.188 -0.362*** 
PSAPA  1 0.738***  -0.055  -0.213 0.234* -0.268** -0.113 0.250* 
PSAQ   1 -0.104  -0.079 -0.176 0.266** 0.233* -0.181 
ACI    1 -0.067 -0.105 0.197 0.191 -0.125 
Growth      1 0.099 -0.271** -0.014 0.062 
Leverage      1 -0.027 0.200 0.538*** 
INV/TA       1 0.437*** -0.258** 
AR/TA        1 -0.195 
NCL         1 
          
Notes: *, **, *** two-tailed statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. The 
variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the proportion of 
internal audit staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 
1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the proportion of 
internal audit staff who have accounting qualification to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= 
proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; ACI – indicator variable of audit committee 
effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total number of members in the audit 
committee), 0 if proportion<0.7, 1 if 0.7<=proportion <=1; Growth - market-to-book value of equity; 
Leverage - current and non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA – inventory divided by total 
assets; AR/TA – account receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by total 
assets.   
Table 4 and 5 provide the results of the multiple regression models performed to test the 
various hypotheses
19
. As reported in Table 4, the interaction terms between internal auditor 
quality and growth are positively and significantly associated with firm performance (ROA) for 
the two proxies of internal auditor quality (p < 0.05 for PSAPA and PSAQ)
20
. The coefficients in 
Equation A and B suggest that a positive association between IAQ (in terms of accounting 
                                                 
19
 The statistical analyses and interpretations of the results followed the approach adopted by Govindarajan and 
Fisher (1990) and Gul and Chia (1994). 
20
 An equivalent test, as suggested in Cohen and Cohen (1983), is to test the statistical significance of the incremental 
R
2
 with the addition of the interaction term. Unreported results show that the increases in R
2
 are statistically 
significant with the interaction term included in the regression (For example, R
2
 increases from 19 percent to 29 
percent in the case of PSAPA). 
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backgrounds or prior experience of the staff) and firm performance is contingent on the level of 
growth opportunities.  
Table 4  
Regression of Firm Performance on Internal Auditor Quality and Growth 
 Equation A Equation B 
 IAQ = PSAPA IAQ = PSAQ 
VAR Coefficients Coefficients 
   
Intercept 0.102**  0.051  
IAQ (X1) -0.030*  -0.007  
Growth (X2) -0.022  0.000  
IAQ*Growth (X1 X2) 0.028**  0.018*  
Leverage -0.047  -0.039  
INV/TA -0.028  -0.052  
AR/TA 0.087**  0.078**  
NCL -0.133**  -0.154**  
   
Adj.R
2
 0.291  0.276  
F. Value 4.455***  4.206***  
  . 
Notes: *, **, *** one-tailed statistical significance of white-corrected t values at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 level respectively. The variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point 
scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the 
internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - 
three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting qualification to the size of 
the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1;  Growth - 
market-to-book value of equity; Leverage - current and non-current liabilities divided by total equity; 
INV/TA – inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net 
current liabilities divided by total assets.  
The partial derivatives of Equation A and B in Table 4 over different internal auditor quality 
proxies give the following results: 
 
Equation A: Y /  X1 = -0.0347 + 0.0380X2         (6.1) 
Equation B: Y /  X1 = -0.0181 + 0.0298X2         (6.2) 
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Equation A and B will be zero when X2 (growth) has a value of 0.9132 and 0.4548 
respectively, which are known as the inflection points (i.e. where the change in the direction of the 
relations occur). In other words, the association between IAQ and performance (ROA) are 
positive (negative) when growth is above (below) the inflection points, as shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1  
Partial Derivatives of Firm Performance (Y) with respect to Internal Auditor Quality (X1) on 
Firm‟s Growth (X2) 
  
Panel A: Internal audit staff with prior work experience in auditing. (X1 = PSAPA) 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 1 2 3 4 5
X2
dY
/d
X
1
 
 
Panel B: Internal audit staff with accounting qualification. (X1 = PSAQ) 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 1 2 3 4 5
X2
d
Y
/d
X
1
 
These inflection points are within the range of observable values for X2 (1 - 5, see Table 1) 
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for the above equations. Therefore, the above results show that for firms with a higher level of 
growth, internal auditor quality is positively associated with better firm performance in terms of 
ROA, and the reverse is true for firms with a lower level of growth, consistent with hypothesis 
one. 
Table 5 reports the results of testing hypothesis two. Similar to the above analysis, it is found 
that the three-way interaction terms are negative and significant for the two proxies for internal 
auditor quality (p < 0.05 for PSAPA and p<0.01 for PSAQ)
21
. To examine the effect of audit 
committee independence on the relation between growth, internal auditor quality and firm 
performance, the partial derivatives of Equation A and B in Table 5 over internal auditor quality 
are analyzed as follows: 
 
Equation A: Y /  X1 = -0.0592 + 0.0527 X2 + 0.0733 X3 – 0.0626 X2 X3    (7.1) 
Equation B: Y /  X1 = -0.0792 + 0.0603 X2 + 0.1446 X3 – 0.0970 X2 X3    (7.2) 
 
Equations A and B suggest that the effect of internal auditor quality on firm performance is a 
function of both the level of growth and audit committee independence
22
.  Govindarajan and 
Fisher (1990: 274) suggest that the values and significance of the unstandardised coefficients will 
change when the origin points of the independent variables change, but a change in the origin 
points of the independent variables will have no impact on the value or significance of the 
unstandardised coefficients of the three-way interaction term.  Therefore, apart from the 
                                                 
21
 Unreported results also show that the addition of the ACI variable significantly increases the explanatory power of 
the models. 
22
 The subsequent interpretation followed the approach adopted by Govindarajan and Fisher (1990). 
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three-way interaction term (b7) the coefficients for Equation 2 in Table 5 are not interpretable 
since they can be altered by shifting the origin points of X1, X2, and X3.  Consequently, the purpose 
of Equation 2 is to provide information on the interaction of X1, X2, and X3 on Y, not on the main 
effects.  In addition, multicollinearity is not an issue with Equation 2 as multicollinearity is 
eliminated by manipulating the origin points of the independent variables and the R
2
 to zero which 
does not affect the significance of b7 (Govindarajan and Fisher 1990). 
Table 5  
Regression of Firm Performance on Internal Auditor Quality, Growth and Audit Committee 
Independence. 
 Equation A Equation B 
 IAQ = PSAPA IAQ = PSAQ 
VAR Coefficients Coefficients 
Intercept 0.167**  0.186***  
IAQ (X1) -0.053**  -0.064***  
Growth (X2) -0.059*  -0.071**  
ACI (X3) -0.178**  -0.304***  
IAQ*Growth (X1 X2) 0.044***  0.049***  
IAQ*ACI (X1 X3) 0.063**  0.123***  
Growth*ACI (X2 X3) 0.160***  0.206***  
IAQ*Growth*ACI (X1 X2 X3) -0.062***  -0.085***  
Leverage -0.082  -0.054  
INV/TA -0.002  -0.054*  
AR/TA 0.090**  0.069*  
NCL -0.079  -0.080  
   
Adj. R
2
 0.302  0.383  
F. Value 3.322  4.333  
   
Notes: *, **, *** one-tailed statistical significance of white-corrected t values at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
level respectively. The variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale 
of the proportion of internal audit staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the 
internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - 
three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting qualification to the size of 
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the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; ACI – 
indicator variable of audit committee effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total 
number of members in the audit committee), 0 if proportion<0.7, 1 if 0.7<=proportion <=1; Growth - 
market-to-book value of equity; Leverage - current and non-current liabilities divided by total equity; 
INV/TA – inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net 
current liabilities divided by total assets.   
 
In order to analyze the relationship under low audit committee independence, ACI (X3) is set 
to 0.  The above equations are then expressed as follows: 
 
Y /  X1 = -0.0592 + 0.0527 X2            (8.1) 
Y /  X1 = -0.0792 + 0.0603 X2           (8.2) 
The inflection points are 1.123 and 1.313 respectively. On the other hand, the equations are 
expressed as follows if ACI is set to 1: 
 
Y /  X1 = 0.0141 - 0.0099 X2           (9.1) 
Y /  X1 = 0.0654 – 0.0367 X2                 (9.2) 
 
The inflection points will be 1.424 and 1.782 respectively. These points are illustrated in 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 2  
Partial Derivatives of Firm Performance (Y) with respect to Internal Auditor Quality (X1) on 
Firm‟s Growth (X2), for Different Levels of Audit Committee Independence (ACI) (X3) 
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Panel B: Internal audit staff with accounting qualification. (X1 = PSAQ) 
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It is shown that for firms with fewer independent directors on the audit committee, the 
equations will be positive when X2 is high (above the inflection points), meaning that there is a 
positive effect of internal auditor quality on firm performance for high growth firms with more 
executive directors on the audit committee.  Interestingly, for firms with more non-executive 
directors on the audit committee, the equations are negative when X2 is above the inflection points, 
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suggesting that the effect of internal auditor quality on firm performance is negative for high 
growth firms with independent audit committees.  This provides evidence of conflict between 
internal audit quality and audit committee independence in terms of their effects on firm 
performance, consistent with hypothesis two
23
. 
 
5.1 Robustness tests 
We conducted three additional tests to assess the robustness of our results. First, we included 
industry dummies in all the regressions to control for the confounding effects of industry 
differences. Second, we included size (log of total assets) in all the regressions with and without 
the industry controls. Regression analyses with controls (dummy variables) for the 8 industries 
with and without the size variable did not change the qualitative nature of the results. Finally, we 
also used return on equity (ROE) as another measure of firm performance and the qualitative 
nature of the results, in general, remain unchanged.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In the current legislative environment, many organizations are considering implementing an 
internal audit function, or are taking actions to improve IAQ, such as appointing more personnel 
with auditing and accounting qualifications in the internal audit department.  However, the extant 
                                                 
23
 Other than analyses on partial derivatives, Hartmann and Moers (1999) suggests that an alternative test of 
non-monotonicity is by means of sub-group linear regressions. This analysis has not been done in view of the small 
sample size of the study (N = 60). 
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literature provides little guidance as to which governance characteristics should be improved if an 
organization desires to increase IAQ and, subsequently, its performance.  Monitoring internal 
control is the result of actions by, and interactions between, management, the internal auditor, the 
external auditor and the audit committee (Krishnan, 2005). This paper provides an insight, albeit 
preliminary, into the role of internal audits and the impact on firm performance and explores the 
inter-relationships between firm and governance factors.   Primarily, our results show that 
effective governance, in terms of internal audits and the audit committee is contingent on the risks 
associated with the firm‟s environment.  In this paper the risks are those associated with the firm‟s 
investment opportunities.   
The findings are subject to a number of limitations. Cross-sectional studies such as this can 
establish associations, but not causality.  Given the paucity of research into the association 
between internal audits and the audit committee and contingent factors affecting corporate 
governance it is difficult to identify pervasive themes.  There are many different types of internal 
control systems, we have only considered two.  Future research could also consider the role of the 
board in the interplay between IAQ and ACI.  Another factor that may affect these results is the 
method of data collection, a mail survey, which is subject to response bias.  The results are 
obtained from a small subset of firms that responded to the internal audit survey questionnaire. 
The results could have been different if other firms that did not respond to the survey are included 
in the sample. This research project provides preliminary results and a more comprehensive, 
 36 
national industry association-backed study which increases the sample number and number of 
participating firms in Malaysia would add to the validity of the results.  Finally, our data is from 
Malaysia and the findings may not be germane to other countries.  
The main thrust of our result support the notion that firms need to establish an internal 
control system to manage risk effectively.  An audit committee with a majority of non-executive 
directors may constrain the efficiency of internal audits which impacts firm performance. That is, 
not all firms benefit from ACI, for some firms it is imperative that the AC has firm-specific 
knowledge about operations when assessing risks.  This understanding can only be acquired from 
insider knowledge.  Thus, it is more important for the IA to align with management rather than the 
AC when operating in an uncertain environment such as high investment opportunities.  What is 
important is that there should be a fit between the oganisations' operating environment and the 
monitoring and control functions of the IA and AC.  Therefore we encourage future research that 
considers alternate models of factors that may influence IAQ and enhance corporate governance.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of this study have implications for policy setters and 
regulators. The negative impact of ACI on the association between IAQ and performance for 
growth firms suggests that it is inappropriate to mandate specific AC composition; attention 
should be focused on firm-specific requirements.  Studies of this nature are useful to organizations 
trying to improve the quality of their internal audit, as evaluated from the perspective of the firm‟s 
growth opportunities and their audit committee.  By maintaining the right mix of governance 
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mechanisms, overall governance and hence performance may be improved.   
Finally, the results of this study question the recently released key amendments to the Bursa 
Malaysia corporate governance framework in 2008 which require all members of the audit 
committee to be non-executive directors (Mondovisione News, 2008).  The key amendments of 
the Listing Requirements (LR) and MESDAQ Market Listing Requirements (MMLR) are aimed 
at raising the standards of corporate governance for companies listed on Main Board, Second 
Board and MESDAQ Market and increasing investor confidence
24
.   However, the results from 
this study demonstrate that an insider dominated audit committee may cause conflict for the 
internal auditor which, in turn, has an adverse effect on firm performance. This suggests that the 
important thing is not the independence of the audit committee, but rather having the right mix of 
members with the necessary skills to evaluate the risks faced by the firm.  The key amendments to 
the Bursa Malaysia corporate governance framework may need to be adjusted, for example, to an 
audit committee composition which reflects a simple majority of non-executive directors (with a 
non-executive chair).  This will allow for representation of inside directors who possess the 
firm-specific knowledge necessary to properly assess risk especially in high-growth opportunity 
firms.  Consequently, this will allow for the balance necessary between the "agent" and 
                                                 
24 Bursa Malaysia Berhad announced key amendments to the corporate governance framework under Listing 
requirements and MESDAQ Market Listings Requirements on 28 January 2008.  The key amendments include:- 
requiring all audit committee members to be non-executive directors; mandating the internal audit function by listed 
issuers and requiring the internal audit function of listed issuers to report directly to the audit committee; expanding 
the functions of the audit committee to include the review of the adequacy of the competency of the internal audit 
function; setting out the rights of audit committee to convene meetings with external auditors, internal auditors or 
both, excluding the attendance of other directors and employees of the listed issuer.  The amendments will take effect 
from 28 January 2008.  
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"principal" representation.  The trend towards legislating for non-executive/independent 
representation (where there was often little or none on boards) is not slowing.  However, this does 
not mean that the public policy pendulum cannot be adjusted back somewhat. 
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Appendix 
Extract of Internal Audit Survey 2003 relating to in-house internal audit arrangements. 
 
Question 5. How many staff are there in your in-house audit section/unit? 
___________________ 
 
Question 6. How many of the staff in your internal audit department have 
  i)  an accounting qualification?__________________________ 
  ii)  prior work experience in auditing?_____________________ 
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